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David Jennex*

Dworkin and the Doctrine
of Judicial Discretion

In a series of books and articles published over the last thirty years,
Ronald Dworkin has relentlessly attacked the positivist view according
to which law is a species of empirically verifiable fact.' A position closely
associated with this view, and with which Dworkin also takes issue, is the
doctrine of judicial discretion. This doctrine asserts that in hard cases cases in which it is unclear what the law requires - there is no legally
required dispensation, so that judges are entitled to use discretion in
making their decision. Dworkin disagrees, maintaining that in many such
cases a thorough investigation into the implications of legal standards
bearing on the issue in question will reveal a unique solution. His critics
almost uniformly portray this claim as entailing that there is a single right
answer for every case, and subsequently dismiss it as requiring too much
of the language in which law is expressed and the judges who must
interpret it. This is ironic, since Dworkin's objection focusses on what he
takes to be an unrealistically strong demand by positivists concerning the
verifiability of legal standards. In what follows I examine Dworkin's
arguments so as to show that his detractors have largely misunderstood
his position regarding the resolvability of hard cases. I argue that he is
correct inmaintaining that judges may sometimes be required to reach
controversial decisions, but that this is compatible with a criterion of
verifiability commonly encountered in the empirical sciences.
I. Hart,Dworkin, and the Doctrine ofJudicialDiscretion
In The Concept ofLaw2 , H. L. A. Hart defends the traditional positivist
claim that law is a matter of observable social fact conceptually distinct
from questions of moral or political philosophy. However, he departs
from the traditional understanding of that claim according to which law
*David Jennex is a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at the University of Waterloo. Apart from
philosophy of law, his interests include a wide variety of topics in moral and social philosophy.
His dissertation concerns the moral implications of genetic engineering.
1. R. Dworkin, "Judicial Discretion" (1963),60J. of Philosophy 624-638: R. Dworkin, Taking
RightsSeriously (London: Gerald Duckworth &Co., 1977): R. Dworkin, "No Right Answer",
in P.M. Hacker & J. Raz, eds., Law, Moralityand Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); R.
Dworkin, "A Reply by Ronald Dworkin", in M. Cohen, ed., RonaldDworkin and ContemporaryJurisprudence(New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983): R. Dworkin, Law's Empire

(Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1986): R. Dworkin, "The Bork Nomination", New
York Review of Books, Aug. 13, 1987.
2. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
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is constituted by the commands of a sovereign, contending instead that
law is better conceived of as a system of rulesthat are accepted by at least
the judiciary of a community. A consequence of his identification of law
with a set of institutionally recognized rules is his commitment to a
certain strong form of the doctrine of judicial discretion. Isolating
precedents and statutes as the preeminent sources of law, he argues that
in both cases there is an inevitable area of uncertainty regarding how they
are to be applied to certain specific states of affairs. With precedents this
point is obvious. Although judges sometimes cite rules to justify their
decisions in particular cases, they are fundamentally concerned with
rendering ajudgment only for the case at hand. It may therefore be largely
indeterminate what general maxims are to be extracted from past decisions, so that judges are given considerable latitude in establishing the
latters' gravitational force. In the case of statutes, the indeterminacy is
less obvious, but is there all the same. So as to cover a wide variety of
relevantly similar situations, statutes are expressed in general terms.
However, general terms are subject to a penumbra of vagueness that
makes it difficult to discern their applicability to states of affairs not
anticipated by the authors of the statutes in question.3 It is this "open
texture" of language that ensures that although the vast majority of cases
brought before the courts uncontroversially fall either within or without
the purview of established law, there will remain a number of cases in
wfiich judges must go outside authoritative legal sources in making their
pronouncements. This is not to say that judges have license to decide
arbitrarily, or are exempt from criticism. Apart from their legal obligations they are expected to employ commonly understood standards of
fairness and rationality in reaching their decisions. What Hart claims is
that when the indeterminacy of law, whether the result of the absence of
clearly identifiable rules or the vagueness of institutionally acknowledged ones, renders it questionable as to which one of a number of
possible case decisions is correct, the judge cannot be criticized on legal
grounds for choosing one of the alternatives. It is this sense in which
judges can be said to have discretion in deciding hard cases.4
In "Hard Cases" 5, Dworkin develops a comprehensive theory of legal
interpretation that contradicts the Hartian doctrine of judicial discretion.
According to this theory judges must apply a principle of "articulate
consistency" in determining the applicability of statutes and precedents
to controversial cases. To illustrate, Dworkin postulates an ideal judge,
3. Hart cites the example of a law prohibiting "vehicles" from a park. Does "vehicles" include

bicycles, airplanes and roller skates? Or is it primarily meant to refer to automobiles? Hart, The
Concept of Law, ibid., at 123-125.
4. R. Dworkin, "Hard Cases", in his Taking Rights Seriously, supra,note 1, at 81-130.
5. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, supra, note 2.
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called Hercules, who presides over a representative American jurisdiction. Faced, for example, with a hard constitutional case, Hercules
constructs a number of political theories that might serve as justifications
for the body of constitutional rules that are directly relevant to the issue
at hand. In the event that two or more theories provide equally plausible
interpretations of these rules, and yet prescribe different results for the
hard case, he must turn to the remaining body of constitutional rules and
practices in an effort to construct a political theory for the constitution as
a whole. The successful candidate will "fit" all or most of the established
rules of the constitution in a manner that represents it as a unified and
coherent body of prescriptions for civic behaviour. Hercules will then
apply this extraordinarily comprehensive theory to the hard case. The
same process is to be used to account for statutes and the common law.
Hercules must "construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles
that provide a coherentjustification for all common law precedents, and
so far as these are to be justified on principle, constitutional and statutory
provisions as well."6
Dworkin's claim is that, as far as is possible, actual judges should
emulate the behaviour of Hercules in dealing with hard cases. His primary
justification for this claim rests on the normative implications of the
principle of articulate consistency. This principle, he notes, is actually an
instantiation of a more general standard:
Judges, like all political officials, are subject to the doctrine of political
responsibility. This doctrine states, in its most general form, that political
officials must make only such political decisions as they can justify within
a political theory that also justifies the other decisions they propose to
make. The doctrine seems innocuous in this general form; but it does, even
in this form, condemn a style of political administration that might be
called, following Rawls, intuitionistic. It condemns the practice of making
decisions that seem right in isolation, but cannot be brought within some
comprehensive theory of general principles
and policies that is consistent
7
with other decisions also thought right.
Regarding the obligations of judges, the doctrine of political responsibility requires that they (a) render decisions that enforce already existing law
(b) in a manner that represents the latter as an internally consistent
political theory. Dworkin contends that (a), at least in American law, is
supported by the principle of democracy. According to this principle, the
6. Taking RightsSeriously, supra,note 1,at 116-117. Hercules must also develop a theory of
legal mistakes. That is, assuming that the legal system in question is not entirely coherent, he
must describe some of its statutes and precedents as historical anomalies to be granted no
gravitational force in later decisions. For this and other aspects of Dworkin's coherentist
theory, see ibid., at 105-123.
7. Ibid., at 87.
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community should be governed by a group of elected officials who are
directly responsible to the majority. Judges are not elected, and so are not
responsible to the public in the same way. Therefore, they should not
engage in the production of new law, but should only apply the standards
officially enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, (b) is offered as
the most plausible explanation of the special consideration given by
American judges to precedents and hypothetical examples in their
deliberations. For, as Dworkin notes, they cite political principles in
support of certain decisions only if they can show that the same principles
underlie earlier results, and can be extended to decisions that they would
be prepared to make in the future. Taken together, (a) and (b) constitute
the principle of articulate consistency. Dworkin's claim is that judges
who accept this principle are committed to applying it in the form of his
coherentist strategy to the resolution of hard cases.8 Further, since such
an interpretative strategy will reveal a much richer array of legal standards than the settled law contained in articulable rules, there will be,
contrary to what the Hartian positivist contends, many hard cases for
which judges can in principle find the uniquely required answer.9
At this point, Dworkin's theory takes a turn for the obscure. For he
claims that Hercules' constitutional theory "would be more or less
different from the theory that a different judge would develop, because a
constitutional theory requires judgments about the complex issues of
institutional fit, as well as judgments about political and moral philosophy, and Hercules' judgments will inevitably differ from those other
judges would make."'" This statement suggests that there is a distinction
to be made between the purely descriptive task of providing a political
theory that most coherently accounts for established legal practices and
the normative one of deciding which of a number of competing theories
is morally or politically preferable. And, indeed, in his most recent work
Dworkin describes considerations of fit as providing only a rough
threshold requirement that an interpretation of some part of the law must
meet if it is to be eligible at all." When two or more interpretations meet
8. Ibid., at 86-90, 101-123.
9. Ibid., at 125. Dworkin also appeals to the fact that American judges typically act as iftheir
decisions in hard cases are required by principles that, although perhaps not explicitly
acknowledged in statutes or past decisions, are nonetheless contaioned within the fabric of
established law. Claiming that such principles are "imminent in the law" or implied by "the
general fabric of the law", judges convey the impression that they feel constrained by legal
standards that can only be revealed through a holistic interpretation of settled law. Dworkin
contends that such reports offer prima facie evidence that at least American judges do
characteristically engage in something like his coherentist approach to legal interpretation in
at 112.
hard cases: ibid.,
10. Ibid., at 117.
11. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra. note 1, at 256.

Dworkin and the Doctrine of Judicial Discretion

this requirement equally well, Hercules must choose between them on the
basis of which shows the legal practices of the community as a whole in
the best light from the standpoint of moral and political philosophy.
This aspect of Dworkin's theory is perplexing, given what appears to
be his motivation for constructing an alternative to Hartian positivism in
the first place. As his coherentist or "constructivist" approach indicates,
he is attempting to demonstrate that the number of hard cases for which
there is no unique legal resolution is much smaller than the Hartian
positivist would have us believe. It is unclear, however, how requiring
judges to engage in normative evaluations so as to identify valid law
furthers this aim. In the absence of wide-spread agreement on moral and
political matters, there seems no way of discriminating between two or
more accounts of a legal system that depend on normative judgments
beyond those engendered in coherence considerations. Including such
judgments among the legalfactorsjudges must consider, therefore, offers
little hope of reducing indeterminacy in law. Moreover, in arguing that
law is fundamentally tied to questions of moral truth, Dworkin appears to
commit himself to an impossibly strong claim. For all that is required to
refute it is the existence of a conceivable legal system in which the truth
of a moral principle is not among the truth conditions for any proposition
12
of law.
Whether or not Dworkin can answer these objections to the extrainstitutionally normative requirements of his theory, I consider in the rest
of this essay his arguments concerning judicial discretion only in the
context of his coherentist approach to hard cases. I believe that the crux
of his dissatisfaction with the Hartian doctrine ofjudicial discretion can
be supported on these grounds only. If this is so, his arguments will be
of wider interest, since there is in principle no reason why coherentist
considerations cannot be incorporated within a positivist theory of law.
II. Dworkin and His Critics
Assuming the viability of the principle of articulate consistency as a
model for resolving hard cases, it would seem that Dworkin has provided
a strong argument that at least American judges are obligated to embrace
his coherentist theory in this context. It is this asgumption, however, with
which many of his critics take issue. For no matter how convincing are his
arguments concerning the dedication of American law to the principle of
articulate consistency, he is open to the charge that as a methodological
precept the latter is an ideal that cannot be realized in the context of hard
12. Foran elaboration of this point, See L. Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism" in
RonaldDworkin and ContemporaryJurisprudence,supra,note 1, at 30.
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cases. Joseph Raz, for example, argues that Dworkin's theory merely
pushes the problem of linguistic vagueness back to the level of the
standards and principles that judges, inspired by Hercules example, will
find embedded within the fabric of settled law. Even if such principles
entail results for some cases in which rules do not, claims Raz, there will
still, because of the open texture of the language in which they must be
expressed, be instances in which judges are given no clear guidance as to
what the law requires. In such instances, he concludes, the Hartian claim
that judges may use discretion in reaching a decision holds."' 3
Raz's objection presupposes, as does its Hartian counterpart, that the
binding effects of legal standards are exhausted by the abstract meanings
of the terms in which they are expressed. On this view, if the relevant
terms are vague, the legal force of the standards in question is indeterminate. This fails to appreciate, however, Dworkin's contention that the
meaning of a legal principle, however firmly established, may vary
according to which political theory is postulated by a judge as the best
account of the legal system as a whole. This process is inherently
dynamic, as the judge is required to continually reconsider the current
best theory in light of novel considerations suggested by hard cases. If this
theory, or any of its composite principles, is vague in its prescription for
an unanticipated state-of-affairs, then it, like the settled law it is meant to
explain, must be reinterpreted so as to include the anomalous circumstances within its domain. On Dworkin's view, then, the apparent
vagueness of a legal standard is an indication that more interpretation is
called for; it does not by itself preclude there being a right answer for a
hard case. 14
A different yet related objection could perhaps be erected -without
denying the premises of Dworkin's coherentist theory. Stephen R.
Munzer, for example, argues that it is consistent with this approach that
two political accounts of a legal system, each with a different implication
for a hard case, could be equally well supported by institutional considerations.' 5 In such a case there would be a tie between the two accounts,
and therefore no uniquely right answer to be found. Dworkin acknowledges this possibility, and admits that in such a case the judge might be
justified in using discretion. He points out, however, that ajudgment that
such a case is at hand would have to be made within the interpretive
enterprise described in his coherentist strategy. To illustrate, he postu13. J. Raz, "Legal Principles and the Limits of Law" in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary
Jurisprudence,supra, note 1.
14. For Dworkin's more detailed reply to this argument from vagueness, see "No Right
Answer", supra, note 1, at 67-69.
15. S.R. Muzner, "Right Answers, Preexisting Rights, and Fairness" (1977), 11 Georgia L. R.
1055-68 at 1057.
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lates for the judge a scale of confidence, with the right side gradating
toward the position in which she is absolutely sure that the law supports
the plaintiff's claim, and the left toward the position in which she is
absolutely sure that it supports the defendants claim:
We may now return to the philosopher's claim that ... judges [makel a
profound mistake by assuming that there can be a right answer in a hard
case. If we take his claim to be a claim within the enterprise, then the claim
is almost certainly false. It comes to this: the tie judgment is necessarily the
right judgment in every single controversial case, that is, in every case in
which one answer cannot be proved in a way that can only be challenged
by the irrational. Now (unless special instruction to ignore ties is part of the
enterprise) every judge will concede that some hard cases may in fact be
ties, but no judge will suppose that they are all ties. The philosopher, to
support his claim against their opinion, would have to provide arguments
affirmatively establishing that all hard cases will lie at the exact center of
and that claim is so implausible that it can be set
the scale we imagined,
6
aside at once.'
Ihave quoted this lengthy passage because it clearly articulates Dworkin's
general complaintwith theHartian doctrine ofjudicial discretion. Dworkin
is not claiming that there is necessarily a right answer for every hard
case.'7 Rather, he argues that the question of whether there is a right
answer for a hard case can only be decided after the judge has, to the best
of her ability, exhausted the institutional application of his coherence
model to the relevant system of law. Conversely, the Hartian thesis claims
that on the basis of philosophical considerations external to interpretive
claims about actual legal systems, there is never a uniquely correct
answer for a hard case. It is, of course, possible that, despite Dworkin's
polemics, such a claim could be made of a particularlegal system, as
would be the system were to contain a requirement that legal solutions be
deduced directly from settled law. But, again, such a claim would have
to be defended according to considerations internal to a reading of the
system in question, and could not support the much stronger Hartian
contention.
III. ControversialityandHard Cases
Unless the Hartian doctrine of judicial discretion, then, is to be taken as
merely a claim about a particular legal system, it must show, on the basis
of general philosophical argument, that hard cases are in principle
incapable of unique legal resolution. Hart's and Raz's arguments con16. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra,note 1, at 287.

17. Although he does maintain that the more complex a legal system that accepts the principle
of articulate consistency the more likely it is that there will be a right answer for every case:
ibid., at 286.
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cerning the vagueness of legal standards are two failed such attempts.
They are instructive, however, in that they suggest a central motivation
behind positivist legal theories, namely, the desire to identify precise
standards for the identification of valid law. The original positivist
theories of Bentham and Austin were largely reactions to the natural law
tradition, whose basic tenet is that any valid proposition of law must also
be a true proposition of morality. Bentham and Austin pointed out that
since there is no general agreement as to what exactly are the true
propositions of morality, the precise identification of legal norms would,
on this account, be inherently problematic. Their solution was to stipulate
that law is a species of observable, and therefore verifiable, fact, specifically, the commands of a sovereign. Hart's rule of recognition is also, in
part, an attempt to bring law within the domain of demonstrable fact. This
is implied, for example, by his remarks concerning the evolution of a prelegal society into one that has a legal system. The process is complete,
claims Hart, upon the community's adoption of a rule of recognition,
because the features of valid law made explicit in this secondary rule
serve to cure the uncertainty latent in the application of what were
formerly imprecise community standards.18
If the Hartian doctrine of judicial discretion is viewed as an extension
of the positivistic drive for precision in law, it perhaps can be recast in
terms of the controversialityof hard cases. 9 For it is a salient feature of
such cases that there is often disagreement among jurists as to how they
should be resolved. A Hartian might argue that disagreement of this sort
undermines the contention that judges are always obligated to find right
answers. Kent Greenawalt, for example, claims that
We do not usually speak of someone as being under a duty to reach a
particular decision when we think the grounds of testing the correctness of
that decision so complex that we cannot say with confidence if a decision
is correct, when we do not even know practically how to test correctness
and when we do not think the actor himself has a solid basis for choosing
one decision rather than another... [W]e should not [therefore] describe
a Supreme Court Justice as under a "duty" to decide a case one way or the
other, if authoritative materials give no clear guidance and lawyers equal
in intelligence, moral understanding and social concern divide on which
decision is sounder.2"

There are two separate claims made in this passage. One is that there
is in practice no method of determining the correctness of answers to hard
18. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, supra, note 2, at 89-90. Dworkin makes this observation in "A
Reply by Ronald Dworkin", supra, note 1, at 248.
19. Dworkin contends that this is the rationale behind most arguments for the legitimacy of
judicial discretion: See "No Right Answer", supra, note 1, at 69, 76.
20. K. Greenawalt, "Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That
Bind Judges" (1975), 7 Columbia L.R. 359-399 at 374.
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cases, and that therefore judges cannot have a duty to decide them in a
particular way. If Dworkin's arguments concerning the commitment of
American law to the principle of articulate consistency are correct, then,
at least locally, this claim is false. Lawyers and legal scholars recognize
arguments of institutional support as decisive in settling questions of law.
In any case, therefore, be it easy or hard, the answer that is entailed by
principles that together provide the best explanation of settled law must
be judged as the correct one. This is not to say that there will not be cases
in which a judge will be unable to decide between two competing
answers. Such cases, however, imply only that the accepted method of
settling questions of law does not always indicate a single right answer,
and not that in general no such method exists.
Greenwalt's second claim is that since competent jurists do not agree
over what are the right answers in hard cases, judges cannot be held
responsible for finding what the law uniquely requires. The hidden
premisein this argument is that since competent jurists disagree over right
answers, none can conclusively be shown to exist. Before this premise is
accepted, however, it should be observed that disagreement over the
solutions to difficult problems is encountered in many disciplines.
Historians and natural scientists, for example, present empirical hypotheses on the basis of a systematic appeal to the facts, and yet sometimes
experience reluctance, or even refusal, on the part of some of their
colleagues to accept their findings. This in itself is not generally viewed
as proof that their positions are false or nonsensical. Of course, if the
evidence they cite is viewed by the community at large as utterly
unrelated to the issue at hand, it will rightly be dismissed. If, however, it
is granted initial plausibility, the hypothesis being argued will subsequently be tested against other propositions accepted by the community.
If the hypothesis survives such testing, it will over a period of time
become established as part of the collective body of knowledge of the
discipline. If it does not, it will be considered falsified, and either
modified or replaced. It is important to stress, however, that nothing
concerning the truth of the claim is established solely on the basis of its
initial controversiality. Indeed, such controversiality is expected as part
of the process of verification. Moreover, supposing that the practitioners
of the discipline are dedicated to discovering the truth about the world, be
it historical or physical truth, they are obligated to pursue, on the basis of
what they take to be the best available evidence, even the most unpopular
21
hypotheses.

21. For this account of objectivity as it applies to science, see K. Popper, TheLogic ofScientific
Discovery (London: Hutchinson Press, 1959) at 44-48.
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Analogously, one way to look at proffered answers in case law is as the
implications of legal hypotheses, whose truth is to be established through
a public process of verification. Like historical and scientific claims, they
are to be made on the grounds of what their advocates take to be the best
available evidence. In routine cases, judges need do little more than
determine what the established theory or paradigm of law requires in
particular circumstances. However, new social problems occasionally
produce hard cases which cannot be resolved by the prevailing theory. In
such cases judges must either revise the theory so that it provides an
answer for the hard case, or replace it with one that does and in addition
offers at least as coherent an explanation of settled law as the original.
Assuming that the alternative explanation is initially plausible, its truth
or falsity will be determined only after it has been thoroughly tested in
subsequent case law and through argumentation on the part of legal
scholars. On this account, judges, like their historical and scientific
counterparts, are obligated even in the face of controversy to render the
judgement that they believe is most clearly supported by the institutional
22
facts.
If my analogy is sound, then judicial opinions are corrigiblehypotheses subject to falsification by the legal community. This clashes,
however, with the popular belief among lawyers that a much higher
degree of certainty must be exhibited before a proposition of law can be
verified as true. Such lawyers typically view abstract arguments of
institutional fit as appeals to a fictional realm of transcendental legal
norms, whose existence can never finally be proven. In their view, unless
an assertion of law can be demonstrated by reference to observable "hard"
facts, such as a clearly worded statute or an institutional recognition of an
assertion by ajudge, then it is nothing more than an expression of opinion
that they are free to accept or reject. Although this is a familiar argument,2

22. A similar proposal is made by N. B. Reynolds, "The Concept of Objectivity in Judicial
Reasoning" (1975), 14 Western Ont. L.R. 1, at 21-29. Reynolds claims that the notion of
objectivity contained in this model is an advance on Dworkin's views, as Dworkin appears to

admit only coherence considerations as indicative of right answers. Such a theory, suggests
Reynolds, does not portray judges as testing their hypotheses in the real world of future legal
experience, after they have performed the coherence test. See Reynolds, at 26-27. It is true that

Dworkin nowhere explicitly endorses the model of community testing outlined above.
However, such a model is consistent with his theory of judicial mistakes, in which he contends
that judges must fasten on the forward-looking, rather than the backward-looking, implications
of precedent. According to this theory, judges are required to treat decisions that are "widely
regretted" by jurists as vulnerable. See Taking Rights Seriously,supranote 1 at 122, also at 88,
where the relevance of hypothetical examples is mentioned.
23. For example, see A.D. Woozley "No Right Answer", at 173-18 1, and Coleman, "Negative
and Positive Positivism", at supra,note 9, at 31-35, both in RonaldDworkinandContemporary
Jurisprudence,supra, note 1.
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it is fundamentally misguided. It depends, first of all on a distinction
between two kinds of facts: the "hard" observable kind investigated by
the empirical sciences and the "soft" interpretive sort appealed to in, for
example, literary criticism. But this distinction is not helpful in a legal
context. Although the actions of legislators and judges may be hard
observable facts,24 the statutes and opinions they establish are not. For
statements of law, even of this concrete sort, are expressed in language,
and as such are subject to interpretation. This may not seem to be the case,
since the meaning of many legal pronouncements appears clear and
indisputable. But this is a result of the general interpretive strategy
accepted by the community that isolates certain propositions as fixed
points of reference. Such propositions are stratified in law schools and
precedents to the point that ajudge who denies them is considered corrupt
or incompetent. But it is not inconceivable that at some later date the
social climate might change to the point that a radical reinterpretation that
is otherwise explanatorily complete might persuade the community to
abandon what was formerly a legal "fact". To insist otherwise is to
subscribe to a theory of language in which isolatible statements have a
single indisputable meaning in virtue of their direct correspondence to
reality, a view long since fallen into philosophical disrepute.'
Secondly, even if there were hard legal facts, the objection being
considered misconceives the role of interpretation, or, perhaps better put,
theory-building, in law. In science, where hard facts exist if they do
anywhere, theories constructed so as to explain the relevant data are no
less interpretations that their legal counterparts. They are more characteristically referred to as inductive inferences to the best explanation, but
there is no reason in principle why this description could not also be
applied to legal interpretations. If there are hard facts, in science or in law,
they can only be made sense of through coherently constructed
understandings of how they together constitute the world in which people
live.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that Dworkin is correct in rejecting the Hartian
doctrine ofjudicial discretion. The claim thatjudges are in principle never

24. The assertion that there are hard observable facts of even this sort if challenged in W.V.O.
Quine, Word and Object, (Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1959), c. 1.
25. See Dworkin, Law's Empire,supra,note 1,at 88-92 for Dworkin's account of how certain
legal propositions, which he refers to as "paradigms" of interpretation, became established in
a legal community. For an exposure of the shortcomings of the theory of language according
to which isolatable words have inherent meanings, see Quine, supra,note 21, c. 2.
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obligated to find right answers in hard cases is dependent on a Cartesian
demand for certainty that cannot be met in any discipline where descriptive hypotheses are subject to public testing and argumentation. However, this leaves it open as to whether the strong doctrine of discretion
holds for any actual, as opposed to hypothetical, legal systems. Dworkin
claims that in American law there is a presumption in favour of there
being right answers for hard cases, but this is an interpretive assertion that
can be contested. Some opponents argue, for example, that American law
is inconsistent because of its commitment to certain incompatible political principles.2 6 Others claim that law should be understood only in terms
of the intentions of its original authors, and not according to holistic
interpretations.27 Either of these claims, if correct, would refute Dworkin's
contention that the American legal system incorporates a coherent
scheme of rights that specifies a single right answer for virtually every
case brought before the courts. This would be a significant result, since
the American system, with its strong doctrine of precedent, is arguably
more deeply committed to the principle of articulate consistency than any
other currently in existence. However, even if such claims are true,
Dworkin would still have made an important contribution to legal
philosophy. For his point stands that such arguments must be made on the
basis of falsifiable interpretations of actual legal systems, and not on the
general philosophical claim that hard cases are inherently incapable of a
unique legal resolution.

26. Such is the contention, for example, of certain members of the critical legal studies
movement. See Dworkin,Law's Empire, supra,note 1, at 274-275, and accompanying note 20.
27. This is, for example, the contention of Judge Robert Bork. See Dworkin, "The Bork
Nomination", supra, note 1.

